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The Labour Government (1997–2010) created a large number of new laws
affecting religion. The Blair and Brown years saw the incorporation of Article
9 of the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law, the creation
of religiously-aggravated offences, the recognition of civil partnerships, and a
tide of legislation affecting education, charities and equality law, which saw
the extension of the law to cover discrimination on grounds of religion or
belief. And all this legislation has resulted in an abundance of case law.2
There is more ‘religion law’ – national and international law affecting religion –
than ever before.3 And, for some time, there has been an implicit tension in
English law between this new religion law and older laws protecting religion.
These old laws, many still on the statute books, were based upon a different
premise. They often sought to protect Christianity in general (or the Church
of England in particular) as the norm, while providing some degree of toleration
for other faiths. Moreover, the legal regulation of religion was characterised by a
lightness of touch. The new religion law, by contrast, is facilitative,4 seeking to
protect religious freedom mainly as an individual right which needs to be
balanced against other rights.5 No special protection is afforded to any one reli-
gion and protection is often afforded to non-religious beliefs. The new legal fra-
mework affords utmost importance to the concept of religious neutrality as the
State takes on the role of facilitating the religious market place.6 The tension
between the old laws on religion and the new ‘religion law’ can be seen, for
example, in the abolition of the offence of blasphemy (which favoured the
1 I am grateful to my colleagues at the Centre for Law and Religion, especially Professor Norman Doe
and Frank Cranmer for their invaluable guidance.
2 See the Law and Religion Scholars Network Case Database at: ,http://www.law.cf.ac.uk/clr/net-
works/lrsncd.html., accessed 23 July 2010.
3 For further elucidation of the concept of ‘religion law’ see R Sandberg, ‘Church-State Relations in
Europe: From Legal Models to an Interdisciplinary Approach’ (2008) 1(3) Journal of Religion in
Europe 329, 336-340. The concept will be developed in R Sandberg, Law and Religion (Cambridge,
2011) forthcoming.
4 See M Hill and R Sandberg, ‘Is Nothing Sacred? Clashing Symbols in a Secular World’ [2007] Public
Law 488–506.
5 Often, however, individual religious rights are only protected where the beliefs are shared by a group:
see Eweida v British Airways [2010] EWCA Civ 80.
6 See, eg the judgment of the Grand Chamber in Refah Partisi v Turkey (2003) 37 EHRR 1 at para 91.
E C C L E S I A S T I C A L L AW J OU RNA L 3 6 1
Church of England in particular) and its replacement by offences concerning
religious hatred (which covers all religions).7 This tension has recently come
to the fore in the Court of Appeal ruling in the application for leave to appeal
in McFarlane v Relate Avon Limited.8
THE DECISION
The case concerned aChristian counsellorwhowas dismissed because he refused
to counsel same-sex couples on sexual matters. Both the Employment Tribunal
and the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT)9 rejected McFarlane’s claims of
unfair dismissal and religious discrimination. The case was almost simultaneous
with the factually similar case of Ladele v LondonBorough of Islington10 and so it was
unsurprising that the various judgments inMcFarlane relied heavily upon those
in Ladele, making the dismissal of McFarlane’s appeal application almost inevita-
ble. However, McFarlane should not be relegated to footnote status. A witness
statement by Lord Carey of Clifton, formerly Archbishop of Canterbury, provoked
Lord Justice Laws to deliver a significant judgment which elucidated the relation-
ship between Christianity and the law and, consequentially, the relationship
between the older laws on religion and the new religion law.
TheCourt of Appeal decision focusedon the question of indirect discrimination.
In relation to direct discrimination, the claim failed because Relate did not treat
McFarlane less favourably on grounds of religion.11 McFarlane was treated as he
was because of his unwillingness to provide counselling rather than because of
his Christian faith. The question of indirect discrimination, however, was more
controversial. It was agreed that McFarlane had been disadvantaged and that
Relate’s actions had had a legitimate aim (the provision of counselling services
to all sections of the community regardless of sexual orientation) but it was dis-
puted whether the absolute rule was proportionate with McFarlane contending
that there was no good reasonwhy he should not be allowed to counsel only hetero-
sexual couples on the basis of his religious convictions about homosexuality.12
Both the EAT and the Court of Appeal found Ladele to be definitive on
this point. As Laws LJ noted, the two cases ‘cannot sensibly be distinguished’.13
7 See M Hill and R Sandberg, ‘Blasphemy and Human Rights: An English Experience in a European
Context’ IV (2009) Derecho y Religio´n [Law and Religion] 145–160.
8 McFarlane v Relate Avon Limited; Application for Leave to Appeal, case number A2/2009/2733.
9 [2009] UKEAT 0106/09/3011 (30 November 2009).
10 Ladele v London Borough of Islington [2008] UKEAT 0453/08/RN (10 December 2008); [2009] EWCA
(Civ) 1357. For a fuller discussion of this decision, see Lucy Vickers’ article in this issue of the Journal,
‘Religious Discrimination in the Workplace: An Emerging Hierarchy?’ (2010) 12 Ecc LJ 280–303.
11 Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003, SI 2003/1660, reg 3(1)(a).
12 Laws LJ noted that, ‘The applicant is a Christian who (in the words of the EAT, paragraph 4) “believes
that it follows from Biblical teaching that same sex sexual activity is sinful and that he should do
nothing which endorses such activity”’: McFarlane v Relate Avon Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ B1 (29
April 2010) at para 4.
13 Para 27.
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In Ladele14 the Court of Appeal emphasised that Ladele was employed in a public
job and was being ‘required to perform a purely secular task, which was being
treated as part of her job’.15 The Court of Appeal quoted the EAT’s statement that
‘the only way in which they could have achieved that aim was by requiring all
their registrars to conduct civil partnerships’.16 The Court of Appeal held that
the aim of their equality policy was ‘of general, indeed overarching, policy sig-
nificance to Islington, and it also had fundamental human rights, equality
and diversity implications, whereas the effect on Ms Ladele of implementing
the policy did not impinge on her religious beliefs: she remained free to hold
those beliefs, and free to worship as she wished’.17
There are a number of flaws with this argument in Ladele. The argument
seems one-sided. There is no recognition that equality policy protects discrimi-
nation on grounds of religion as well as on grounds of sexual orientation.
Preventing discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation is described as
being of ‘overarching, policy significance’ whilst freedom of religion is defined
very narrowly. Indeed, taken literally, Ladele seemed to suggest that freedom of
thought, conscience and religion only included the right to hold beliefs and
worship. This is not the case as the text of Article 9 makes clear. In sum, in
Ladele the laudable aim of preventing discrimination on grounds of sexual orien-
tation was used to annihilate the claim of religious discrimination.18
THE ARGUMENTS
It is not surprising that counsel for McFarlane chose to focus upon this point in
the application for permission to appeal. It was argued that the Court of Appeal
judgment in Ladele ‘failed properly to consider other decisions’ concerning
Article 9, ignored the principle of legality and was ‘unconstitutional and con-
trary to the rule of law’.19 It was submitted that both the EAT in McFarlane
and the Court of Appeal in Ladele failed ‘to conduct the balancing exercise’
between the two competing claims of religious discrimination and sexual
14 [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1357.
15 Para 52.
16 Para 50.
17 Para 51.
18 See further R Sandberg, ‘The Implications of the Court of Appeal Decision in Ladele’, paper pre-
sented to the Interfaith Legal Advisers Network (Lambeth Palace, 1 March 2010), available as part
of the Working Paper Series coordinated by the Centre for Law for Law and Religion at Cardiff
University. See: ,http://www.law.cf.ac.uk/clr/research/WorkingPapers.html., accessed 23 July
2010.
19 Para 14. McFarlane was not an Article 9 claim. However, under section 3 of the Human Rights Act
1998, domestic courts are required to construe domestic laws compatibly with Convention rights. As
the EATconfirmed in Eweida v British Airways UKEAT/0123/08LA (20 November 2008), this means
that ‘the same (or at least no less favourable) approachmust be adopted to the concept of religion and
belief in the 2003 Regulations’ as is protected under Article 9: see para 27.
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orientation discrimination. The case was supported by a witness statement by
Lord Carey arguing for ‘a specially constituted Court of Appeal of five Lords
Justices who have a proven sensibility to religious issues’.20 Lord Carey criticised
the description of Christian beliefs about sexuality as ‘discriminatory’ and
lamented what he perceived to be ‘disparaging comments’ made by senior
members of the judiciary which suggested that someone who held religious
views was ‘a homophobe and disreputable’. He further suggested that the fact
that senior clerics felt compelled to intervene in recent cases was ‘illuminative
of a future civil unrest’.
Laws LJ’s judgment sought to address these concerns and focussed mainly
upon Lord Carey’s statement. He held that this was appropriate given Carey’s
‘seniority in the Church and the extent to which others may agree with his
views, and because of the misunderstanding of the law which his statement
reveals’.21 The following will seek to elucidate the four key issues discussed in
the judgment, namely: the level of protection provided by Article 9, the
concept of discrimination, the legal favouring of Christianity and the protection
of religious doctrine.
THE PROTECTION PROVIDED BY ARTICLE 9 ECHR
Laws LJ dealt swiftly with the argument that the judgment in Ladele had been
decided per incuriam because it failed properly to consider the Article 9 case
law. Counsel for McFarlane contended that the court in Ladele failed to take
into account the judgments in Williamson22 and Copsey23. Laws LJ held that
Ladele was not inconsistent with either decision because in both cases it had
been held although that the claimant’s beliefs fell within the scope of Article
9(1), there had been no breach of Article 9.24 However, whilst it is true that
the Article 9 claim was unsuccessful in both of these cases, it is also the case
thatWilliamson and Copsey took a more generous approach to Article 9 than sub-
sequent cases. Since the House of Lords decision in Begum,25 domestic courts
have tended to interpret the Article 9 rights in a narrow and conservative
fashion, uncritically following Lord Bingham’s questionable assertion that ‘inter-
ference [with Article 9] is not easily established’26 and making repeated use of
20 Para 17.
21 Para 16.
22 R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment, ex parte Williamson [2005] UKHL 15, discussed by
S Langlaude, ‘Flogging Children with Religion: A Comment on the House of Lords’ Decision in
Williamson’ (2006) 8 Ecc LJ 339–345.
23 Copsey v WBB Devon Clays Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 932, discussed by G Watson, ‘Sunday Working and
Human Rights’ (2006) 8 Ecc LJ 333–334.
24 Para 15.
25 R (Begum) v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15.
26 See para 24.
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the ‘specific situation rule’.27 The result of this is that Article 9 is rendered of
little practical use.28 This tendency could be seen in Ladele. The Court of
Appeal held that ‘Ladele’s proper and genuine desire to have her religious
views relating to marriage respected should not be permitted to override
Islington’s concern to ensure that all its registrars manifest equal respect for
the homosexual community as for the heterosexual community’.29 The treat-
ment of Article 9 in Ladele was of concern because whilst it highlighted the
need to protect discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, it ignored the
need to protect discrimination on grounds of religion or belief. The Court of
Appeal decision in Ladele showed how the application of the ‘specific situation
rule’ renders Article 9 impotent by allowing other Convention rights to
‘trump’ it with ease. It is a matter of regret that Laws LJ did not deal with this
matter in McFarlane,30 choosing to focus more on refuting the arguments in
Lord Carey’s witness statement.
THE CONCEPT OF DISCRIMINATION
Laws LJ held that Lord Carey’s concern that Christian views were equated
to homophobia was ‘misplaced’.31 Finding no examples of judges likening
Christians to bigots, Laws LJ concluded that Lord Carey’s ‘mistaken suggestions’
arose from a misunderstanding of the meaning attributed by the law to the idea
of discrimination.32 Laws LJ noted that ‘the proposition that if conduct is
accepted as discriminatory it thereby falls to be condemned as disreputable or
bigoted is a non sequitur.’ He noted that the motivation for discrimination
could be ‘for good or ill’ and that was shown by the fact that ‘in various contexts
the law allows indirect discrimination where (in a carefully controlled legislative
27 This recognises that a person’s Article 9 rights may be influenced by the particular situation of the
individual claiming that freedom. This principle is not of universal application: it only applies where
someone has voluntarily submitted themselves to a system of norms, usually by means of a contract.
This voluntary submission creates a ‘specific situation’ which limits the claimant’s right to manifest.
Whilst Strasbourg has tended to use this rule only in prescribed circumstances, the domestic judi-
ciary seem to apply it generally. See also James Dingemans’ comments on the ‘doctrine of non-inter-
ference’ at pp 371–378 below.
28 See further, M Hill and R Sandberg, ‘Is Nothing Sacred? Clashing Symbols in a Secular World’ [2007]
Public Law 488–506; R Sandberg, ‘The Changing Position of Religious Minorities in English Law:
The Legacy of Begum’ in R Grillo et al (ed), Legal Practice and Cultural Diversity (Aldershot, 2009)
267–282.
29 [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1357 at para 55.
30 This is especially true in relation to Ladele where it is questionable whether the ‘specific situation
rule’ ought to apply. Ladele had not voluntarily agreed to a contract of employment that included
civil partnerships. When Ladele applied for her job, there was no such thing. In Copsey v WBB
Devon Clays Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 932, Rix LJ argued that the specific situation rule did not apply
where an employer rather than the employees ought to vary the employee’s working hours: see
particularly paras 65–67.
31 Para 18.
32 Para 19.
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setting) it can be shown to have justifiable effects’. These comments are sound.
However, they point to a problemwith the use of the word ‘discrimination’ which
has been commented upon by David Harte.33 For Harte, the word ‘discrimi-
nation’ has ‘become a negative concept, expressing prejudiced judgement’, and
this has occurred to such an extent that it is now difficult to use the word ‘to
mean the drawing of justified distinctions’.34 Indeed, the problematic colloquial
meaning of the word ‘discrimination’ is shown by the fact that the product of the
work of the Discrimination Law Review was the Equality Act 2010.35 Laws LJ’s
comments are therefore to be welcomed as an attempt to remove the unintended
stigma which has become attached to the word ‘discrimination’, whichmay be in
part responsible for the frequently simplistic media accounts of litigation.36
THE FAVOURING OF CHRISTIANITY
In relation to the other points raised by Lord Carey, Laws LJ commented that
they were ‘formulated at such a level of generality that it is hard to know pre-
cisely what Lord Carey’ meant.37 He surmised Carey’s argument to be broadly
that ‘the courts ought to be more sympathetic to the substance of the
Christian beliefs referred to than appears to be the case, and should be
readier than they are to uphold and defend them’.38 Expressed in this way,
Laws LJ’s rejection of Carey’s argument seems sound. Human rights and dis-
crimination law safeguards mean that Christianity cannot be singled out for
special treatment. However, it is again important not to ignore the other side
of the coin. Christianity should not be disadvantaged under the law. The laud-
able practice of protecting minority faiths should not result in disfavour being
shown to Christianity.
Laws LJ addressed this by stressing that:
The general law may of course protect a particular social or moral position
which is espoused by Christianity, not because of its religious imprimatur,
but on the footing that in reason its merits commend themselves. So it
is with core provisions of the criminal law: the prohibition of violence
and dishonesty. The Judaeo-Christian tradition, stretching over many cen-
turies, has no doubt exerted a profound influence upon the judgment of
33 D Harte, ‘Structures of Religious Pluralism in English Law’ in N Doe and R Sandberg (eds), Law and
Religion: New Horizons (Leuven, 2010) 159–190.
34 Ibid 164–165. He proposes the use of the term ‘discernment’ as an alternative.
35 Emphasis added.
36 See A Bradney, ‘Some Sceptical Thoughts about the Academic Analysis of Law and Religion in the
United Kingdom’ in N Doe and R Sandberg (eds), Law and Religion: New Horizons (Leuven, 2010)
299–314.
37 Para 21.
38 Ibid.
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lawmakers as to the objective merits of this or that social policy. And the
liturgy and practice of the established Church are to some extent pre-
scribed by law. But the conferment of any legal protection or preference
upon a particular substantive moral position on the ground only that it
is espoused by the adherents of a particular faith, however long its tra-
dition, however rich its culture, is deeply unprincipled.39
Again, the general underlying point here is sound: we do not live in a theocracy.
If Laws LJ is simply asserting that it is not the role of the law to embrace specific
examples of religious practice then this is unobjectionable. Laws LJ is correct to
maintain that the ‘precepts of any one religion – any belief system – cannot, by
force of their religious origins, sound any louder in the general law than the pre-
cepts of any other’.40 As he puts it, ‘the State, if its people are to be free, has the
burdensome duty of thinking for itself’.41 However, Laws LJ seems to be stating
that the law protects certain values not because they are religious values but by
reason of their own merits. This is a different argument from saying that
Christian ideas have become submerged into general culture. If Laws LJ’s judg-
ment is saying that the law will never protect religion as such then this seems
inaccurate. Special treatment is afforded in many areas of law to protect reli-
gious ideas. The reason why there is so much religion law is because religious
ideas (as opposed to opinions or leisure pastimes) are deemed to be worthy of
support. The notion that religion is a good thing and is worth protecting for
that reason can still be said to underpin the law.42 Laws LJ is correct to say
that this does not mean that the State approves of, endorses or follows any par-
ticular religious belief.43 But the argument that the law will never protect reli-
gion as such is questionable.44 Indeed, as Laws LJ noted, reflections of a
Judaeo-Christian heritage can still be found in English law. Although the eccle-
siastical courts have lost their jurisdiction over the enforcement of the law of
contract, trusts, defamation and wills,45 their legacy upon the substantive laws
39 Para 23.
40 Para 24.
41 Ibid.
42 This has been most clearly elucidated in the context of charity law. See the quotation from Gilmour v
Coats [1949] AC 426, HL, at n 44 below. InNeville Estates v Madden [1962] Ch 852 it was declared that
declared that ‘any religion is at least likely to be better than none’.
43 As Patten J held in Varsani v Jesani [2002] 1 P&CR DG 11, ‘the court has no choice but to assume an
agnostic role’ (para 11).
44 A preferable approach was expressed in Gilmour v Coats [1949] AC 426 concerning charity law: ‘The
law of England has always shown favour to gifts for religious purposes. It does not now in this matter
prefer one religion to another. It assumes that it is good for man to have and to practise a religion but
where a particular belief is accepted by one religion and rejected by another the law can neither
accept nor reject it. The law must accept the position that it is right that different religions should
each be supported irrespective of whether or not all its beliefs are true’ (at 458–459).
45 See generally RH Helmholz, The Oxford History of the Laws of England: Volume 1, The Canon Law and
Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction from 597 to the 1640s (Oxford, 2004) and RB Outhwaite, The Rise and Fall of
the Ecclesiastical Courts, 1500–1860 (Cambridge, 2006).
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and procedures of modern English law continues. Clerical fingerprints can still
be found over modern pieces of English law, especially in relation to marriage
and education law.46 The historical synthesis of law and Christianity means
that many laws are the way they are because of those clerical fingerprints.
And it is difficult to say that these laws are the way they are simply because
their ‘merits commend themselves’; especially as the criteria by which we
assess such merits itself derive from the same Judaeo-Christian heritage.
Laws LJ’s reasoning needs to be understood within the context of the new reli-
gion law, which is underpinned by a notion of religious equality that is ahistori-
cal and which does not sit comfortably with legal reality. In modern eyes, many
aspects of the UK constitution may appear ‘unprincipled’ (to use Laws LJ’s term)
but this does not mean that they are wrong and need to be changed. This is true
of the benefits and burdens placed on the Church of England as the established
church. As Strasbourg has stated, the existence of a State Church is not in itself
incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights; there is only
incompatibility if that special treatment prevents the religious freedom of
those who do not conform to the State Church.47 It must be remembered that
the new religion law and its rhetoric of religious neutrality does not exist in a
legal and historical vacuum.
THE PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS DOCTRINE
In addressing Lord Carey’s concerns, Laws LJ emphasised the ‘important distinc-
tion . . . drawn between the law’s protection of the right to hold and express a
belief and the law’s protection of that belief’s substance or content’.48 He held
that the common law and Article 9 provided ‘vigorous protection of the
Christian’s right (and every other person’s right) to hold and express his or her
beliefs’ but ‘do not, and should not, offer any protection whatever of the substance
or content of those beliefs on the ground only that they are based on religious
precepts.’49 Again, this is unobjectionable if it is merely an assertion that
we do not live in a theocracy. Law LJ’s comments are also welcome if they
are meant as recognition of religious autonomy, reaffirming Lord Nicholls’
46 For example the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857, s 22, provides that the proceedings and actions of the
courts of the State should be ‘conformable to the Principles and Rules on which the Ecclesiastical
Courts have heretofore acted and given Relief’; the School Standards and Framework Act 1998
requires a daily act of worship in schools which is wholly or mainly of a broadly Christian character’
(s 70, sch 20).
47 See Darby v Sweden (1991) 13 EHRR 774 As Ahdar and Leigh point out, legal preference for a certain
religion is not antithetical to religious freedom ‘at least in its contemporary, milder form: the two can
coexist as a matter of principle provided that legal preference is not accompanied by distinct civil and
legal disabilities for the non-adherents of the official religion’: R Ahdar and I Leigh, Religious Freedom
in the Liberal State (Oxford, 2005) 129–30.
48 Para 22.
49 Ibid.
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judgment inWilliamson that courts should be reluctant to intervene in doctrinal
matters.50 While Courts may be concerned with whether or not the claim of reli-
gious belief was made in good faith, they are not concerned whether the reli-
gious belief professed is a good faith in terms of judging the validity of that
faith.51 Laws LJ’s comments are especially welcome since some of the lower
court decisions have increasingly entered into what Laws LJ referred to as the
‘belief’s substance or content’ in order to determine whether the manifestation
is obligatory or central to the belief.52
However, it is questionable whether a watertight line can and should be
drawn between the protection of the right to hold a belief and protection of
the content of that belief. Surely it is the substance or content of the belief
that singles it out for protection. As Lord Nicholls noted in Williamson, in
order to be protected as a manifestation of belief under Article 9, a belief
‘must relate to matters more than merely trivial. It must possess an adequate
degree of seriousness and importance. [It] must be a belief on a fundamental
problem. . . . The belief must also be coherent in the sense of being intelligible
and capable of being understood’.53 The reason why a belief in the supreme
nature of the Jedi knights is not protected is precisely because the substance
or content of that belief does not meet the Williamson thresholds.54
Laws LJ seems to be saying that the substance of beliefs should not be pro-
tected solely on the ground that they are ‘religious precepts’. Laws LJ’s reasoning
appears to go too far. This is most notable when he asserts that:
The promulgation of law for the protection of a position held purely on reli-
gious grounds cannot therefore be justified. It is irrational, as preferring
the subjective over the objective.55
A lot depends on the meaning of the word ‘purely’ here. Arguably Article 9 and
several other pieces of religion law have been promulgated in order to provide
‘protection of a position held on religious grounds’. This is perhaps epitomised
by the numerous exceptions afforded in discrimination law to religious
groups.56 And the Strasbourg jurisprudence makes it plain that the State is
50 R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment, ex parte Williamson [2005] UKHL 15 at para 33.
51 R Sandberg, ‘Controversial Recent Claims to Religious Liberty’ (2008) 124 Law Quarterly Review 213.
52 See, for instance, R (on the Application of Playfoot (A Child)) v Millais School Governing Body [2007]
EWHC Admin 1698.
53 [2005] UKHL 15 at para 23.
54 This example was raised by the then Attorney General in debates concerning what was to become the
Equality Act 2006: see the discussion in Grainger PLC v Nicholson [2009] UKEAT 0219/09/ZT (3
November 2009) at para 28.
55 [2005] UKHL 15 at para 24.
56 See R Sandberg and N Doe, ‘Religious Exemptions in Discrimination Law’ (2007) 66(2) Cambridge
Law Journal 302–312. The impact of recent case law and the Equality Act 2010 in this area will be
discussed in R Sandberg, ‘The Right to Discriminate’ (2011) 13 Ecc LJ (forthcoming).
E C C L E S I A S T I C A L L AW J OU RNA L 3 6 9
obligated to facilitate religious freedom. Although many laws are underpinned
by a perception that there is a need to protect religion in its own right, it is
unclear whether they were promulgated to protect views held ‘purely’ on reli-
gious grounds. The reference to objectivity and subjectivity is also troubling,
bearing in mind Lord Nicholls’ statement inWilliamson that ‘freedom of religion
protects the subjective belief of an individual’.57
CONCLUSIONS
It would be unfortunate if the Court of Appeal decision in Ladele were to over-
shadow the decision in McFarlane. Laws LJ’s judgment will have important
ramifications upon the future protection of law and religion in the United
Kingdom. By following Ladele and by not criticising its reasoning in relation
to Article 9, McFarlane endorses a trend whereby more protection is seemingly
given to combating discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation than
preventing discrimination on grounds of religion or belief. McFarlane gives
further weight to the impression that Article 9 becoming increasingly toothless.
However, Laws LJ’s flat rejection of Lord Carey’s call for a specially constituted
Court of Appeal protecting religious issues was undoubtedly the correct
response to a proposal which showed a complete lack of understanding of the
judicial process.58 Lord Carey’s call was particularly ironic given that Lord
Carey was one of the most vocal critics of his successor’s lecture in which Dr
Rowan Williams suggested tentatively that more use could be made of religious
courts.59 The nuance found in Dr William’s lecture was clearly absent in Lord
Carey’s witness statement.
The broad thrust of Laws LJ’s judgment inMcFarlane is thus to be welcomed,
especially his attempt to remove the stigma that surrounds the word ‘discrimi-
nation’ and the re-emphasis that courts should be reluctant to intervene in doc-
trinal matters. However, there are other aspects of the judgment that are open to
different and sometimes worrying interpretations. It may be inferred from the
judgment that there is no reason to protect religion as such. McFarlane under-
scores the shift that has taken place in the protection of religion. English law
now has several laws which seek to protect religion as an individual right and
great emphasis is given to the notion of religious neutrality. However, these
new laws do not exist in a legal and historical vacuum. And existing and see-
mingly ‘unprincipled’ laws which do not fit neatly with newer ideas of religious
neutrality are not necessarily wrong or incompatible.
doi:10.1017/S0956618X10000451
57 [2005] UKHL 15 at para 22.
58 See M Hill, ‘Judges should not be handpicked’, Church Times, 23 April 2010.
59 See RWilliams, ‘Civil and Religious Law in England – A Religious Perspective’ (2008) 10 Ecc LJ 262.
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